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KEY POINTS

•

For governance reforms in the extractive industries to translate from paper to practice, government officials charged with making key decisions
and undertaking action to implement them must
have both an interest in advancing this agenda
and the requisite power to do so.

•

Focusing on supporting “reformers”—those officials with a genuine commitment to reform—is
a way of trying to start on auspicious footing by
targeting those with an existing interest in seeing good governance of extractive industries take
root.

•

However, to realize the potential of reformers to
drive and sustain relevant policy and institutional
change, the incentive and power dynamics that
can impede these actors must be better understood and more effectively addressed.

•

Two key political obstacles reformers often report
confronting are pressure from powerful elites with
competing preferences (exercised through official
channels as well as through personal and professional threats or coercion) and indifference or resistance among bureaucrats who lack incentives
to undertake meaningful reforms.

•

Reformers, and those seeking to support them,
can take various approaches to addressing these
power and interest (mis)alignments and improve
the prospects of making meaningful progress.

•

From navigating political realities to changing the
balance of power to changing the balance of incentives, reformers should be supported in taking
the lead on identifying and undertaking the politically smart strategy for their own context.

The “reformer” dilemma: When good
intentions meet difficult political realities
This project arose out of conversations over the past
few years between CCSI staff and high-level officials in
extractive industry (EI) ministries in Africa, the Caucasus, and Latin America. After describing the need for an
array of genuine reforms in the governance of their respective countries’ energy and mining sectors, these officials expressed their frustration at the resistance they
encountered from within their own government when
pushing for reform. These pressures come from above
and below.
Interference and pressure from political and economic
elites. On the one hand, the officials explained, they have
been confronted from above by powerful political and economic actors opposed to the reforms in question, likely
because they were benefiting in some way from the status quo. It is not uncommon for political figures to directly
benefit from extractive industries (EI) projects or to receive
political support from the economic elites deriving benefits from the sector (who, in return, may receive favors from
political figures). These powerful actors can undermine the
prospects for advancing reforms directly through political
interference, e.g., issuing orders to avoid certain policies
and practices. They can also indirectly weaken support for
reforms by creating disincentives—through personal and
professional threats—for those who would try to push
ahead with them. Therefore, elites with interests opposed
to the reform agenda can use their power to restrict or disincentivize action by would-be reformers.1
Bureaucratic indifference or resistance. Reform-minded government officials also routinely reported encountering indifference or resistance from bureaucrats, who
are often the chief actors responsible for implementing
reform commitments. Some bureaucrats resist simply because changes in policy or practice complicate their jobs
without major disincentives for failing to undertake reforms
or benefits for succeeding in doing so. Others may resist as
they have an interest in maintaining the status quo from
which they are benefitting in some way.2
In both types of situations, the reform-sympathetic officials reported feeling significantly constrained to use their
positions to bring about meaningful progress on governance and development outcomes in the extractive sec-
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tors of their countries. They perceived themselves to be
isolated and stuck, fearing potentially dire professional
or personal consequences—e.g., harassment or threats
to themselves and their families, loss of their jobs, mandates, or departmental budgets—for pressing forward
with reforms against political headwinds. They expressed
concern that even if adopted on paper, reforms might go
unimplemented due to the resistance, and sometimes
inertia, of those charged with putting them into action
and the continued pressure from opposing elites. In the
face of bureaucratic inertia and hostility from vested interests, they wondered if anything could be done to support them in breathing more life and impact into their
reformist intentions.
We heard similar versions of this story from would-be “reformers”—various government officials possessing a genuine interest in advancing good governance of extractive
industries (GEI)—in other countries and regions. Over and
over, we heard from these well-intentioned actors that
they faced the same dilemma of power and interests being
stacked against their prospects of meaningfully advancing a good governance agenda. In light of their experiences, we set out to explore the question: what can global
actors and “reformers” do to help translate their good
intentions into good practice in the face of unfavorable
political realities?
This think piece is intended to provide an approach to systematically thinking through how to be more sensitive to
(1) the challenges facing reformers in their respective countries in trying to undertake interventions that make meaningful progress towards intended goals in improving the
governance of EI (GEI), and (2) the alignments of power and
incentives needed to bring about meaningful and lasting
reforms. In doing so, we hope to provide insights into what
can be done to (a) more opportunistically navigate the political constraints and opportunities facing reformers, (b)
amplify the power of reformers, and (c) shift the interests
and incentives of those who are already in powerful positions to persuade them to support reforms in practice.
Why reformers?
This brief takes as a starting assumption that in order for
reforms to be impactful, there must be actors who are not
only willing to help drive their emergence and effective
implementation but have the power to do so. For positive

changes to be anything more than superficial or fleeting,
these actors must have the influence and the will to make
a sustained and durable commitment to these reforms.3
By betting on “reformers” (described variously as “change
agents,” “champions for change,” and “development or
political entrepreneurs”4), the intention is to pick an auspicious starting point: those who already have an interest
in the reform agenda. The trick is then to help them bring
power and interest alignments into better service of their
reform goals. Because reformers can play an essential role
in shepherding reforms forward, thinking through ways to
clear their paths and bolster their effectiveness presents a
promising approach to making more meaningful progress.
The literature is scarce on this topic. While a recent report
by Guerzovich et al. commissioned by the Open Society
Foundations explores a range of technical, political, and
other contextual factors that can impact the effectiveness
of anti-corruption reformers,5 in this think piece we focus
on some of the key political contextual factors that can
confront would-be GEI reformers and potential ways of
addressing these.
Box 1:
Challenges of Identifying and Targeting Reformers
Officials with a sincere interest in reforms may not always be immediately visible to outsiders (or even insiders): even actors genuinely committed to reform may be
constrained from making their commitments public. In
Ghana, for instance, public officials swear a secrecy oath,
which may prevent them from airing troubling dynamics
publicly.6 Reformers may also be constrained by hard-todiscern intra-party dynamics and leadership or be relatively powerless to resist enforcing problematic policies
dictated to them by superiors, which may again obscure
their underlying sympathies to good governance. Another thing to keep in mind when trying to identify reformers is that their views will not necessarily be consistent
across issues or constant over time; personal or contextual factors may drive them to positions that are more
conservative or, alternatively, even more reformist at different times or on different issues. Strong local partners
with insights into the political landscape are therefore
vital in making these assessments.
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Understanding the political challenges and
opportunities facing reformers
Before considering how to address the political challenges
(and opportunities) that reformers confront, it is important
to invest in identifying what/who needs to be addressed
and possible openings and obstacles to doing so. As noted by a long-time IFI expert participant in a recent convening held for this research project, deep local knowledge is
crucial for improving the prospects of impact of any GEI
interventions, including those focused on reformers. An important aspect of this would be a diagnostic assessment
of local context through regular political economy analysis
(PEA).7 While such analyses vary in length, methodology,
and scope, a simple PEA entails mapping key stakeholders, their relative power, the interests or incentives driving
their respective decisions in a given policy or practical area,
and the main channels through which they exercise their
influence over relevant processes or outcomes. In essence,
a PEA involves answering questions such as:
•
•

•

•

•

•

Who would need to do what to bring about progress
toward your desired outcomes or ultimate goals? What
is the likelihood of this occurring?
Who are the key players with regard to a given issue
(e.g., specific government officials within relevant ministries, regulators, investors, project partners, influential
individuals, etc.)? Beyond these actors, are there others
who might have a strong interest in this specific issue?
Who has power (formal authority, informal influence,
or both) over the fate of a particular area of policy
or practice? Among the key players, who has power
over whom?
What are the priorities and interests of the key players?
Who seems to have a genuine interest (reformer) in reform and why? Are they benefitting from status quo governance conditions that might be affected by the adoption and implementation of the good governance policy
or practice being pursued?
How do these priorities and interests align with a given good practice/policy or change agenda? (In other
words, who might “win” or “lose” as the result of success in achieving your objectives?) What do these (mis)
alignments tell us about potential allies and opponents to the goals being pursued?
Are there specific contextual or systemic factors that
influence the outcomes you care about (including political, cultural, social, or historical considerations)?
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•

Where powerful actors do not perceive an interest in
supporting an aspect of good governance of EI, what
are the prospects of change in the desired direction?
Who would have to do what for this change to occur?
How? And why might they want to do this?

The answers to such questions—assessed on an on-going
basis—can provide a roadmap both to identify potential
obstacles on the political landscape and strategize possible ways of addressing them, making adjustments over
time as needed to maximize impact.
Addressing the political challenges facing
extractives governance reformers
Because of the particular challenges associated with EI—
those qualities that make them particularly prone to rentseeking, clientelism, corruption, and various other wellchronicled social, political, and economic ills associated
with the “resource curse”8—alignments of power and
interests conducive to good governance outcomes can be
difficult to come by. Powerful actors benefitting from the
status quo abound and often exert considerable influence
over how the sector is governed, making prospects of
real reforms that may destabilize their personal gains
unlikely. Under these circumstances, those championing
the adoption and implementation of sector reforms can
face an uphill battle, though not an impossible one. While
there is no set formula, we propose a menu of options for
helping reformers address unfavorable power and interest
dynamics that undermine their ability to advance progress
on reforms. These options are based on an aggregation of
ideas from the broader literature on political economy–
informed development approaches as well as CCSI’s
interviews with past and present reformers. They are
organized around three basic approaches:
•
•
•

navigating the status quo more opportunistically;
changing the balance of power to strengthen the
position of those more supportive of reform agendas;
and
changing the interests and incentives driving
powerful actors.

Options from across these groupings can be taken separately or in tandem depending on the constraints and
opportunities that a given reformer faces at a particular
moment and on the availability of resources on which they
can draw to advance a specific reform. By providing inspi-
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ration and practical ideas for tackling political challenges,
our hope is to improve the prospects of reformers being
able to drive meaningful changes in policy and practice to
improve GEI.

1. Navigating the status quo more opportunistically
In Working with the Grain, Brian Levy calls on development
practitioners working on good governance to begin by “seeing things as they are” in a given context and then working
to maximize feasible gains within that understanding.9 In
essence, this means accepting current political realities as
fairly fixed, at least in the near term, and focusing on how
to get the most progress possible by opportunistically navigating these constraints. “Feasibility” and “actionability”
are the guiding principles of this approach, which can be
operationalized in a number of ways.10
Recalibrate goals and expectations. One approach to
navigating political realities might entail reformers and
their supporters recalibrating their goals to better match
their near- and mid-term prospects of progress. This may
at times mean trading off a focus on transformational goals
for more incremental ones in the short term, e.g. “doing no
harm” where “doing good” in the near term seems unlikely.
When the political environment appears too inhospitable
to advance major changes in good governance, reformers
can try to build momentum through incremental progress,
developing ideas and undertaking groundwork that might
ultimately graduate or accumulate into the desired reform.
Fostering durable policy and institutional changes can, for
instance, require persuading others in government and
society to bring about significant shifts in mindset, which
in turn requires empirical evidence that supports the reform’s rationale. Collecting such evidence and establishing causal connections that lead to meaningful outcomes
can take years of research and policy dialogue; these are
incremental steps to build the eventual case for reform
(which would then need to be conveyed in a strategic and
persuasive way).11
Strategically frame reforms to meet the powerful at
their interests. Another avenue that reformers might pursue in trying to opportunistically make progress is (re)framing the reforms they wish to advance to better align with
what the most powerful actors in the area in question will

support or, at the very least, tolerate. These might include
actors who either hold sufficient individual capacity to sway
political outcomes or control an organization relevant to
the GEI field that is equipped with the power to implement
reforms. While these actors may not be “reform-minded” in
the general sense, some of their interests might align with
global or local GEI reform agendas, and they might therefore be willing to pursue (or just allow) specific changes
that are the most desirable or palatable to them.12
The Curbing Corruption approach to anti-corruption offers
an explicit example of a pathway for this—gathering together a group of powerful actors within a particular sector to discuss what aspects of corruption they are willing
to see tackled and focusing anti-corruption activities on
those.13 A more implicit approach would be to identify major interests of political and economic elites through PEA
and to then craft reform activities in ways that resonate
with these interests or do not overtly clash with them. In
Mexico, a bill legislating commitments under the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169) in the context of the Hydrocarbon and Electricity Laws failed several
times in parliament. It passed only after the reform proponent managed to frame the reform as increasing revenue
to the state (by assuaging communities that would otherwise disrupt energy operations), contributing to its passage
with support across party lines.14 “Bundling” specific GEI
reforms in packages with other, low-controversy measures
may also be another way for reformers to use strategic
framing or packaging to make some progress within their
political constraints.15
Look for and seize windows of opportunity. Another option for supporting reformers in more effectively navigating
their political realities is to help them recognize and act on
“windows of opportunity” (henceforth, “windows”). These
are moments during which there is an acute shift of interests
and incentives among powerful actors, creating finite openings to support major changes in policy and practice.16 Windows—explored thoroughly in Guerzovich et al. (2020)—are
very context-specific, time-bound, and are often the convergence of some array of social, historical, cultural, economic, political, or environmental forces.17 As such, they are
difficult to plan for or induce, but it is possible to prepare
the groundwork to capitalize on them when they do appear
(see Box on Georgia).18
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Box 2:
Capitalizing on a Sudden Opening
of a Window of Opportunity - Georgia
In Georgia, a collective consensus across camp lines and
parties emerged from a long series of public hearings,
streamed live, held by the Environmental Protection and
Natural Resources Committee of the Parliament on the
importance of monitoring the environmental impacts of
mines. In these hearings, relevant ministries, companies,
and civil society were invited on numerous occasions to
contribute to the debate in a context where environmental impacts were discussed at an unprecedented level of
transparency. It is noteworthy that the process was made
transparent as the parliamentary committee created a
working group composed of multi-sectoral representatives, including CSOs, and they were provided with the
opportunity to reflect on particular cases as well as overall sector challenges. By convening these meetings, the
parliamentary committee created a window to drum up
popular attention to and support for monitoring environmental impacts, changing the balance of incentives for
those who had been trying to minimize these issues via
hollow, populist arguments related to job creation and
fiscal revenues.19
The following are some possible window scenarios
pertaining to EI:
Elections. Both the run-up to and period immediately following elections can precipitate scrutiny and action to
push through progress on a wide range of reforms. Political campaigns can provide an opportunity for opposition
candidates to seek to highlight problems with the existing
regime and the need to reform its policies or practices in
specific ways. Incumbents can use the run-up to an election to propose or pass popular reforms in the hope of
firming up support. Election results can then create opportunities for newly elected officials to establish their agendas or for incumbents potentially to respond to electoral
shifts. For instance, in Zambia, in the 2006 elections and
subsequent by-elections, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was reelected to run the government but
lost all popularity in the Copperbelt and Lusaka, accused
of selling the country to the international private interests.
Given its growing unpopularity, in 2008, the MMD decided to change the fiscal regime and make it more onerous
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on the mining industry. Thus, a government that always
defended the interests of foreign private mining firms unexpectedly changed its perception of the mining industry
based in part on its election performance.20 For a reformer
pushing for fairer fiscal terms for the country, the post-2006
elections provided the political window to advance the
agenda. Similarly, major legislative moments, e.g., the period of proposals and debate around new extractives sector legislation (a new mining code or petroleum law), can
also represent a specific opportunity for reformers to make
meaningful progress.
In the specific case of EI, certain additional types of windows are likely to emerge and present political conditions
conducive to advancing sector-related reforms.
Commodity price drops. EI are well-known for their price
volatility.21 When prices fall, the resulting budget shortfalls and economic dislocations can trigger more scrutiny
of extractives income, with less tolerance for corruption
and mismanagement. Budget shortfalls can also catalyze
openings for, e.g., reforming fuel subsidies while broader
economic malaise can theoretically generate higher demands for social safety nets.22 Commodity price drops may
also potentially spur economic diversification, long viewed
as an important step in breaking free of some of the main
challenges of the resource curse.23 As one or more of these
conditions emerge, they create potential opportunities to
build on public attention and demands to undertake reforms in direct response.
Corruption scandals. EI, particularly oil and gas, can provide
the perfect storm for enabling corruption: high-rent sectors;
key decisions concentrated in the hands of a few officials,
who potentially can derive personal gains from this role;
a dearth of effective accountability mechanisms to hold
these actors in check; and a history of opacity around sector
decisions and activities.24 When these conditions converge
in less democratic settings, opportunities for corruption increase.25 Indeed, Transparency International regards EI as
being among the most corrupt sectors in the world.26 While
much of this corruption goes undetected or unpunished,
oil and mining corruption scandals can at times generate
widespread outrage and a period of heightened demand
for greater transparency and accountability.27
Environmental disasters. Oil, gas, and mining projects can
be hugely damaging to surrounding air, water, soil, and
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vegetation.28 From vast oil sector contamination of the Niger Delta29 to epically catastrophic incidents like the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico30 and major mine
tailings dam failures,31 including the collapse of Samarco’s
Fundão and Vale’s Brumadinho mine tailings dams in Brazil,32 evidence abounds of the potential environmental havoc that EI projects can wreak. When such disasters occur,
they tend to precipitate investigations and a slew of new
regulations.33 These windows emerging from outrage and
attention to environmental risks can create opportunities
to advance a deeper and more comprehensive set of reforms around mitigation and management of environmental risks than might otherwise be politically feasible.34
To these traditional windows of opportunities mentioned
above, we can also add those related to growing awareness and action around the climate crisis. The emerging
worldwide climate change agenda and the disastrous climate change impacts have the potential to create openings for reforms framed around addressing these issues.
Related windows of reforms likely have been re-opened in
various ways in every country depending on the perception
of risks and opportunities involved in the energy transition.
For the potential of windows to be realized, reformers must
be adequately prepared and resourced to act upon them
in a time-sensitive way.35 The trick is to try to lock in as
much progress as possible before the window closes and
those incentives underlying greater support for the reform
agenda dissipate.

2. Increasing the relative power of reformers
In addition to accepting and working to strategically navigate the status quo, there are potential avenues for trying to change power and interest dynamics that thwart
the progress of reformers. Attempts to tip the balance of
power in favor of reformers can be undertaken by building
strength in numbers. As Halloran and Flores note, “[e]ven
where progressive decision makers seek to make positive
changes, they will likely face obstacles from those whose
interests are being challenged, and thus need support from
other pro-reform actors.”36 Successful reforms are rarely the
work of individual actors but rather the result of multiple
actors and organizations coalescing, even temporarily or
through loose connections, around a potential reform program to achieve objectives that they could not achieve on
their own.37 Thus, when powerful political and economic
elites can undercut reform agendas—by formally blocking
their progress or informally putting pressure on reformers—
reformers can try to amplify their own power and impact by
forming strategic coalitions with others who have a shared
interest in a particular reform.38
Combining their influence, resources, expertise, and comparative advantages should allow coalition participants
to collectively wield greater clout in support of a specific
policy or practice than they would have if acting on their
own. The balance of power should shift accordingly: as the
strength of the coalition grows, the relative dominance of
the opposition decreases.39 Such strategic coalitions can be
durable or temporary (lasting as long as needed to achieve
a particular goal), with broad substantive coverage or focused on a particular policy or outcome.40 They can also
involve a range of possible allies working together within
host countries and beyond through formal or informal
mechanisms. Global actors can play a role in contributing
to such coalitions through strategic convenings or creating
mechanisms to foster connections. Let us consider a few
examples of types of coalition configurations.
Horizontal coalitions within government. Within governments, those working to advance a particular reform
might bolster their power by seeking sympathetic allies
across different parts of government beyond their own
ministries or agencies. Such collaborations or “clusters of
reformers” can draw on combined areas of expertise, authority, and networks of the various participants to advance
their respective mandates or goals. They can also help di-
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lute responsibility and prevent specific reformers from being targeted for threats or retribution.
In a Western Africa country, the maritime agency was an
unexpected political ally to the Board of the National Oil
Company in pushing through petroleum law reforms—
seeking to improve the design and marketability of bid
rounds—despite having little obvious institutional overlap
with petroleum. The agency’s mandate over offshore construction gave them some clout to help catalyze a reform
process around petroleum laws.41 In a Caribbean country,
while the Minister of Energy wanted to push his own government to agree to disclose the tax filings of international
oil companies, his bureaucratic staff at the ministry were
opposed to this idea for various reasons. These reasons
included inertia within the government and fear of possible legal backlash in a system of convoluted and little-understood laws governing civil service. To address the latter disincentive to reform, the minister reached out to the
government’s senior counsel, who helped them garner
the support of the bureaucrats by explaining the legality
of the move and assuaging their fears on that issue. This
first step enabled the country to eventually become compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI) standard.42
Horizontal coalitions may also rely on relatively apolitical
groups within the government, i.e., those that have developed a reputation for independence and integrity over
the years and throughout political cycles. A case in point
comes from The Gambia, where a strategic collaboration
with the Central Bank allowed the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Affairs to undertake a series of internal reforms
as well as crucial policy adjustments to save the country
from a macroeconomic crisis and implement painful but
necessary public financial management reforms. This
collaboration and the ensuing reforms helped bolster the
institutional strength and insulation of the ministry from
political interference.43
Vertical coalitions within host countries. Another way of
harnessing the power of collaboration behind reformers is
by building coalitions involving actors beyond the government based on points of shared interests among diverse
actors in a particular reform area. Through vertical coalitions, government officials can connect with other actors
in their countries beyond the central government—from
civil society, relevant technical experts, private sector, local
government officials, social leaders, cultural figures and
groups, religious or spiritual leaders,44 traditional leaders,
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media, academia, etc. Again, the purpose would be to try to
broaden awareness and build and widen support behind a
particular policy or practical reform.
The more support a reform has from various strategically-placed actors, the greater a reformer’s power to implement their priorities will be and the higher the costs of
opposing them.45 In the Philippines, for example, a range
of stakeholders united to reform the powerful tobacco industry by pushing for a ‘sin tax’ on cigarettes and alcohol.46
Partners included reform champions from within various
branches of government, including the executive and the
national legislature; media figures; doctors and others from
health-related organizations; civil society activists, academics, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and advocacy groups. It also included allies of convenience whose
interests overlapped: British American Tobacco (BAT) and
the San Miguel Corporation, “which openly sought to ‘reform’ a tiered tax classification scheme which inhibited
the entry of [their] products into a market monopolized by
others.”47 The legislation secured billions of pesos in new
tax revenue for the government and helped build investor
confidence in the Philippines.48 The process of building the
coalition also helped to “strengthen the political capacities,
knowledge, and connections among a network of ‘reform
entrepreneurs’ within the administration, in Congress, and
in civil society.”49 In another example, multi-stakeholder coalitions connecting government officials with non-governmental actors in Nigeria were able to help bring about legislative reforms related to climate change and to the rights
of those with disabilities.50
Transnational coalitions. Finally, some reformers have
indicated the potential value of linking up with actors outside their country. One version of this might involve counterparts from other countries with experience in extractives
governance issues and activities. Indeed, many interviewees have mentioned the potential value of being part of
such a global network of reformers that would allow them
to benefit from the experiences, knowledge, and strategies
of counterparts confronting analogous extractives governance challenges in their own countries. To our knowledge,
such a network has yet to be created.
Transnational coalitions might also involve actors from international financial institutions (IFIs), international media,
or international non-governmental organizations (INGOs),
whose support, expertise, leverage and resources might
help increase the influence and impact of reformers, even
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if only in a narrow realm or around a specific policy or
practice. Such global actors can act to enhance the reputational credibility, opportunities to exercise voice, access to resources and relevant information available to
reformers. They can do this through formal and informal
actions, from inclusion and spotlighting of reformers in
global meetings or national convenings to providing access
to useful information to which reformers might otherwise
not have access. IFIs’ and INGOs’ recommendations can
also help bolster the positions of reformers by providing
greater evidence or credibility for the need or value of a particular reform, which might provide added ammunition for
winning over otherwise reluctant government officials. IFI
or investor requirements can further strengthen the cause
of reformers by coupling their efforts with the leverage of
external financial players whose money is often sought by
national elites, although IFI representatives providing input
for this project cautioned not to overestimate the extent of
their influence.
In Sierra Leone, a tactical alliance between local reformers
and external partners including IFIs and a major bilateral
donor was able to thwart government interference and
attempts to limit the power and autonomy of the National Minerals Agency.51 Another example from Sierra Leone
involved an INGO, the Natural Resource Governance Institute convening “all stakeholders for the Natural Resource
Benchmarking study that paved the way for the acceptance
of key provisions of the new Minerals Policy adopted by the
Government. The exercise involved a consultative process
considered neutral and not related to Government policy
directly. The evidence gathered and the recommendations
made were endorsed by all, making it easier to push the
reforms in the new Minerals Policy.”52
In a recent example of a transnational coalition supporting
extractives governance reforms, civil society organizations
working with the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Ghana
engaged international allies for specific strategic purposes to try to halt progress on a problematic gold royalties
investment scheme (known as the Agyapa Royalties deal)
being pushed through by the Ministry of Finance and the
President. Transparency International, the Tax Justice Network, and Natural Resource Governance Institute all conducted analyses and raised concerns around the terms
of the scheme (corruption risks, valuation issues, etc.)
and the process of its development (behind closed doors
and involving potential conflicts of interest).53 In doing so,

they raised global attention to the deal among the media,
multi-stakeholder initiatives like the EITI Secretariat, and
IFIs. These international contributions of expert analysis
and pressure, alongside national-level activities, contributed to the coalition being able to temporarily halt progress
on the Agyapa deal and bringing greater scrutiny and attention to its terms and beneficiaries.54
Putting strategic coalitions in practice. While there is no
formula or fixed guidance for successful coalitions, expert
participants in a workshop focused on coalitions for development suggested such coalitions share certain qualities:
“agreement around a common goal and on the rules of
the game, a coalition size as small as possible to achieve
its goals, clear understanding among members of their role
and interest in the coalition, and the inclusion of members
who can fill different roles (e.g. leaders, connectors, gatekeepers, enablers, change champions and links to key
players outside the coalition).”55 Successful coalitions also
benefit from “mechanisms for dealing with distrust and inequality among members, credible and enforceable commitments, sufficient planning to anticipate strategic opportunities balanced with the flexibility to adapt to unexpected events, and learning through evaluation.”56 We consider
two of these factors in greater detail.
Vetting and selecting coalition participants. In seeking to
create cross-cutting coalitions at any level, reformers need
to make strategic decisions about who to include and exclude in hopes of having the best chance of achieving the
intended impacts of the coalition. This requires mapping
the interests of potential members (as explained above)
and their respective levels and areas of influence and exploring different ways to bring together a constellation of
hitherto disconnected actors with a common interest on
which the reformer can build. This information can then
provide the basis for determining whose participation is
most likely to contribute to the effective attainment of a
reformer’s desired outcomes around a particular policy or
practice. One result may be excluding potential participants
who might hold views that are incompatible with those of
the main drivers of the coalition. Another result might be
focusing on including only those who can wield considerable influence or bring strategic resources or relationships
to the table. PEAs can help with these decisions, pinpointing the motivations, interests, and influence of different
key stakeholders.
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In the Philippines, the Asia Foundation used such a process
in assembling a reform coalition that sought to pass a law,
the Residential Free Patent (RFP) Law, to make property
rights titling free instead of the then-current system requiring landowners to bid at a high cost for obtaining the land
title. The coalition team did a stakeholder analysis of “who
cares, who can be made to care, who has the political capital, and how to get them to spend it on this reform.”57 They
ended up zeroing in on two private sector actors, the Rural
Bankers Association of Philippines (RBAP) and the Chamber of Thrift Banks (CTB), as these actors had the highest
interest in pursuing the reform, given that the “dearth of
titled properties constrained secure collateral-based lending to homeowners and small businessmen.”58 The coalition also involved the Department for Environmental and
Natural Resources and the League of Municipalities of
the Philippines (see figure below for overview of coalition
assessment and selection).

Mitigating coalition risks. Once decisions have been made
around whom to include in coalitions, the coalition should
take steps to mitigate any associations that might compromise the goals or legitimacy of the coalition. International coalition members can create risks, which are the focus
of the mitigation strategies discussed here. Though a potentially important source of resources or expertise, their
association with a coalition raises the prospects of accusations of foreign meddling, undermining the work of the
coalition. In some settings, international actors, including
IFIs such as the World Bank or the International Monetary
Fund, might be associated with or dismissed as primarily
serving the interests of multinational corporations. Being
linked with these multinational corporations (whose home
countries are often in developed countries) may be seen
as extending the legacies of a fraught colonial past rather
than serving the interests of the host country. As a result,
association with them might not help make the reform
more popular and might even prove counterproductive in
enhancing credibility.60
International actors and their national partners have
adopted a few strategies to mitigate this problem.

Caption: RBAP: Rural Bankers Association of Philippines, CTB:
Chamber of Thrift Banks, LMP: League of Municipalities of the
Philippines, PCCI: Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry;
DENR: Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Source: Asia Foundation59

Last, as mentioned above, exclusion might also be part of
the vetting and selection process. If some participants are
too radical or prone to co-optation by the opposition, they
can potentially compromise the coalition’s integrity and
goals. In one of the coalitions for reforms discussed with
reformers it was decided to exclude organizations funded
by foreign donors from the coalition as they were seen as
coming with their own perceived biases. It was also decided to exclude those afraid of being compromised by sitting
at the table with other actors (i.e., the government and
private sector).
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Removing international branding: Cognizant of such potentially problematic associations, the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) of the United Kingdom—formerly the Department for International Development (DFID)—has at times deliberately sought to address
this type of risk to local partners by minimizing its branding and ownership of projects, e.g., in programs in Nepal
and Nigeria, to allow local partners and grantees greater
prospects of success.61
Neutralizing the appearance of bias toward any one stakeholder through broad public engagement: The technical
assistance of external advisors is likely to become a source
of contention if only available to one stakeholder. In West
Africa, a petroleum reform proponent made sure to mobilize external advisors to widely sensitize and inform the
general public on the needs and benefits of a petroleum
sector reform. The reform could have been derailed if the
technical knowledge was perceived as being kept in the
hands of only the national oil company and petroleum
ministry while leaving all the others, including legislators,
without technical knowledge to share effective oversight of
the domestic oil industry. More equitably distributing the
knowledge and resources of global actors and institutions
helped to win political battles.62
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Intervening as a learning actor or convenor rather than a
driver of solutions: Transnational coalitions can also be
buttressed by having international actors create opportunities for dialogue and engagement across a wide spectrum
of stakeholders, thereby again avoiding the appearance of
external interference on behalf of one actor and also providing an opportunity for coalition-formation. In Cambodia,
the Asia Foundation wanted to encourage a municipality to
reform the problematic solid waste management systems
in the capital city. To gain trust in its advice, the project team
decided to run pilots showcasing how to improve the situation and involved all partners, including the company that
failed in the management of solid waste in the city. The objective was to show that “the Foundation was not perceived
as coming in with all the answers, but rather learning alongside their counterparts.”63 This process also enabled the
Foundation to identify allies within all channels—including
academia and the media, and above all, the company and
the local and central government. As a result, “being politically and technically informed was then translated into
being politically active—leveraging acquired knowledge
to influence and shape the reform agenda.”64 To the extent
that reformers can activate external allies to function in this
way, they might prove valuable partners in fostering broader engagement around reforms. Another illustration was
raised by IFI interviewees observing, from their experience,
the usefulness of enabling coalition formations through the
simple provision of administrative or organizational capacity for convening.

3. Changing the interests of the powerful
to better align with progress on reforms
For any given reform, there can be specific actors whose
active support or passive acquiescence is needed to clear
the way for progress. Once those who need to be won over
have been identified, it is important to understand the primary interests and incentives driving their choices and actions, i.e., what they care about. Then, reformers can use
this information to consider whether/how they or their allies might strategically influence these through a combination of incentives and disincentives—carrots and sticks—to
increase the support for meaningful reforms. While the specific constellation of levers and actors to be deployed to try
to change the balance of incentives or interests will be context-specific, we include a few illustrative examples here.

Incentivizing support for reformers. Depending on the
nature of the ruling party and on the motivations of key
actors (including reputation sensitivity), external actors
such as IFIs and donors have a number of channels open
to them to incentivize elites to pursue and support effective and impactful reforms.65 Possible avenues for tipping
incentives in favor of reform include:
Persuasion and political bargaining – Perhaps the most
classic methods for winning over political support are
through one-on-one persuasive and political bargaining in
which government officials swap support for each other’s
priority areas. Although these might not always be effective in situations of asymmetric power, they are nonetheless worth considering as strategies that reformers themselves might be able to deploy to incentivize the support or
change the interests of others.
Creating financial or professional benefits for reformers –
One way to expand the ranks of reformers might be to create milestones for meaningful progress and tying some sort
of institutional or personal benefits for reaching them. Performance-based rewards could be integrated into remuneration or professional advancement prospects for bureaucrats. Prizes or awards might be another way to incentivize
people to support reformist agendas. The Ibrahim Prize for
Achievement in African Leadership awards US$ 5 million to
“African executive leaders who, under challenging circumstances, have developed their countries and strengthened
democracy and human rights for the shared benefit of their
people, paving the way for sustainable and equitable prosperity.”66 While the prize is awarded infrequently and only
to leaders with an established and long-standing commitment to good governance and peaceful political turnover,
similar models could be designed and expanded to reward
policy-makers other than executives based on achievements in advancing particular reforms.
Bestowing reputational benefits on reformers – Reputational benefits may also incentivize the ranks of reformers to swell. Accountability Lab’s Integrity Icon67 work, for
instance, inverted the traditional “naming and shaming”
approach to rooting out corruption and poor governance,
instead “‘naming and faming’ honest government officials”
to lend credibility and visibility to their efforts.68 A similar approach might be undertaken at the global level. For some,
recognition in international fora, ceremonies, or events
can act as motivation to engage with the reform agenda.
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Public officials could also be subjected to a ranking system
comparable to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance
(IIAG), which monitors governance performance in African
countries and measures them against certain thresholds
and their peers.69 Finally, the media can be harnessed as
a tool to highlight successful reformers, thereby creating
reputational benefits for them. Positive media coverage
and commentary have also contributed to land reforms
in the Philippines by emboldening a government official
driving reforms to expand coverage of a land titling initiative.70 However, depending on the risks potential reformers
face at home, exposing reformers in these ways may invite
personal or political retribution from opponents. The pros
and cons of exposing and celebrating reformers, therefore,
should be weighed carefully with sensitivity to potential
risks of spotlighting individuals. Care should be also taken to avoid granting reputational benefits to governments
only implementing ‘zombie’ reforms.71 Several reformers
we interviewed reminded us of the weight of home countries and how their way to celebrate or punish behaviors
impact the dynamic of political camps in-country and the
chance for reformers to succeed: “Orthodox policies of punishing the entire country for the ills of a few who capture
the state merely play into the hands of spoilers. At the same
time, there is nothing more painful for champions than to
see known spoilers—human rights perpetrators, corrupt
officials, and compromised administrators—all being feted
by home country leaders.”72
Insulating reformers from financial and political manipulation – Even before the issue of advancing substantive
reforms can be broached, there are a series of process-related steps that can improve the incentives for reform. For
instance, misaligned financial incentives in the public sector can often divert competent and reform-minded individuals from public service because they can do better in
the private sector. A reform-oriented ministry struggling to
attract the best and brightest—who can help do the supporting work to pass the reform or bring political weight to
the reform—needs reliable funding to increase the offered
salaries, but this means it is potentially subject to political
capture and bargaining with the ministry of finance. Mechanisms to ensure financial independence and stability of
reform-minded ministries or ministers can improve their
prospects of retaining their independence and attracting
would-be reformers. Trinidad and Tobago’s Petroleum Regulations stipulate a “Petroleum Impost,” a mandatory fee
imposed on petroleum companies.73 This fee ensures that

12 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

the Ministry of Energy is always fully funded independent
of the Ministry of Finance and state budgets. It can therefore pay the requisite salaries to ensure competent personnel; more importantly, it enables the ministry not to have
to politically compromise on reforms to secure funding.74
The link between economic and political dependence is
also illustrated in countries where the ruling party has been
in longstanding dominance. Where deeply embedded patronage systems exist, those whose livelihoods depend
on the state often feel unable to speak out against the
government for fear of losing their jobs or destroying their
political careers. Enabling the economic independence of
these livelihoods is a political way to grow the supporters of
the reformers.75
Mobilizing the private sector to create demand for governance reforms or specific standards or requirements – With
growing appreciation of the importance of social license to
operate among EI companies and ESG(Environmental, Social, Governance) requests coming from shareholders, reputable publicly listed companies might play a more supportive role in advancing GEI reforms going forward. When
the private sector is an important economic actor, government officials might perceive a greater interest in supporting a reform request coming from them than from other
public or civil society actors. According to our interviews,
the desire to attract the investments of large international
EI companies can serve to incentivize reform when these
companies require certain standards be met and good
practices be undertaken that the host government might
not otherwise undertake, at least with regard to their particular investments. It of course depends on the country, the
history of the extractive sector in this country, and its receptiveness to the private sector’s influence in policy-making.
The example above on reforming land titling in the Philippines by leveraging two bank-related bodies (see Section 2)
illustrates such a possibility. In another example, from West
Africa mentioned above (see Section 2), the international
oil companies supported the state-owned company in its
request to modernize the legal framework.
Creating disincentives for opposing or undermining reforms. Another general approach to addressing
unfavorable interest alignments that might face reformers is to create costs for not undertaking or for failing to
implement reforms.
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Imposing reputational costs – Government officials can
impose costs on others in their ranks by exposing bad
governance practices when appropriate whistle-blowing
mechanisms are in place. Another option is to harness civil
society and the media to change interest calculations by
reporting on reform opposition and spotlighting failures
through classic ‘naming and shaming’ of individuals or
groups responsible for implementing specific reforms. The
unique capacity of media outlets to report stories in ways
that clearly connect the impact of governance failures on
citizens’ lives to the actions of specific actors can lead to
political mobilization and instigate bottom-up pressure on
policy-makers. Such pressure can act as a disincentive for
opposing or undermining reforms among democratically-elected politicians whose power depends on popular
support. In Paraguay, there have already been five bills to
create a Ministry of Energy to fix inefficiencies of the sector
(the sector functions with a vice ministry of energy with no
associated administrative capacity to carry out the oversight role of a ministry). The public sees these bills as merely creating another system of patronage. One reason for this
misperception is that the media has never been mobilized
to explain the link between multiple daily power outages
and the lack of a strong Ministry of Energy, to connect bad
outcomes with the absence of reforms.76 Media engagement can also help sustain the attention of those in power to a particular problem that they might otherwise wish
to avoid, by persistently highlighting the issue and thereby creating costs for ignoring necessary reforms.77 In other words, politicians can remain intentionally uninformed
about a reform necessity unless they are forced to change
by the prospects of negative personal or professional consequences brought on by the media.
Isolating reform opponents – As noted above, the more
supporters a reform has, the higher the perceived benefits
and the lower the perceived costs of supporting the reform
will be; thus, the costs of opposing it will be higher.78 Supporting the formation of strategic coalitions of like-minded
reformers, as discussed above, may provide reformers with
the means to put pressure on those opposed to a particular
reform to abandon their opposition as they feel more and
more isolated or stigmatized.

Box 3:
Summary of the Strategies
NAVIGATING political realities (working more
opportunistically within existing political conditions)
A. Recalibrating goals and expectations
B. (Re)framing reforms to meet the powerful at their
interests
C. Looking for or seizing windows of opportunity
• Elections
• Commodity price drops
• Corruption scandals
• Environmental disasters
CHANGING the balance of power
A. Horizontal intra-governmental coalitions
B. Vertical coalitions across a range of actors in host
country
C. Transnational coalitions
• Global networks of reformers (sharing
knowledge and experience and building
‘political courage’)
• Coalitions involving INGOs and IFIs
CHANGING the balance of incentives (for joining
reformers)
A. Incentivizing support for reformers
• Persuasion and political bargaining
• Creating financial incentives – initiatives like
the Mo Ibrahim Prize
• Creating reputational incentives – highlighting
integrity or otherwise bestowing reputational
benefits on those supporting reforms
(integrity-focused activities, international
recognition)
• Insulating reformers from financial and
political manipulation
• Mobilizing private sector and surge in ESG
requirements
B. Disincentivizing those opposing reformers
• Imposing reputational costs (‘naming and
shaming’)
• Isolating reform opponents or imposing
political costs for opposing reforms

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 13

Think Piece: Unlocking the Power of Reformers to Achieve Better Progress on Extractives Governance

Conclusion
When it comes to improving the governance of extractive
industries—sectors long associated with an array of social,
economic, political, and environmental ills—many powerful actors within governments seem to lack interest or incentives to undertake and implement effective reforms or
may even have strong interests in maintaining the status
quo and actively opposing reforms. Yet, even the most reform-hostile governments are not homogeneous, nor are
their ranks uniformly opposed to positive change. The challenge for those with a strong interest in reforms in hostile
political situations, i.e., where powerful interests stack the
odds against progress, is to figure out how to maximize
their impact. While by no means a simple task, there are
ways for reformers and their allies to try to improve their
chances of success.
In this brief, we have laid out a variety of approaches and
strategies to provide inspiration for reformers and their allies to more strategically engage with their specific political
contexts in hopes of improving outcomes and their ultimate impact on GEI. This range of options can be drawn
on as appropriate in response to the specific constraints,
opportunities, and priorities at play. Ultimately, reformers
need to assume a central role in identifying their needs and
the strategies that make the most sense for them.
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